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For this Research Topic on brain augmen-
tation,1 several authors discuss possibilities
of brain stimulation (e.g., Duecker et al.,
2014), pharmacology (e.g., Lynch et al.,
2014), and psychobiological training (e.g.,
Chapman and Mudar, 2014). According
to a definition proposed by ethicists,
such procedures are human enhancement
if and only if they are a “change in
the biology or psychology of a person
which increases the chances of leading
a good life in the relevant set of cir-
cumstances” (Savulescu et al., 2011b, p.
7). Note how this definition describes
the individual as malleable and the cir-
cumstances as given. The authors con-
tinue to explain that something counts
as enhancement “so long as it tends to
increase a person’s well-being” (Savulescu
et al., 2011b). Similarly, Nagel emphasizes
the notions of happiness, well-being, and
improvement in her discussion of the eth-
ical challenges of enhancement and dis-
cusses the possibilities and risks related to
neuro-technology and psychopharmacol-
ogy (Nagel, 2014).
These and similar publications identify
concepts like improvement or well-being
as foundational issues of the enhancement
debate. This raises important questions,
such as who defines well-being and how
to achieve it. In the three following sec-
tions, I will discuss the conceptualization
of well-being, the framing of enhance-
ment, and the translational promises given
in the literature.
1http://www.frontiersin.org/Systems_Neuroscience/res
earchtopics/Augmentation_of_Brain_Function/1563
WHOSE WELL-BEING?
The majority of the experimen-
tal enhancement literature employs
neuropsychological test designs developed
to measure the presence of psychological
impairment in terms of attention, learn-
ing, memory, and the like (for systematic
reviews, see Repantis et al., 2010; Smith
and Farah, 2011; Bagot and Kaminer,
2014). Referring to this literature in the
human enhancement debate is problem-
atic: That these tests can be used to inform
clinical decisions does not warrant their
usefulness outside the clinics. Higher test
scores do not necessarily reflect a hap-
pier, more meaningful life in general. Yet,
clinical studies are often cited in ethi-
cal discussions to debate the benefits and
prospects of enhancement for the healthy.
This carries the risk of a normative fal-
lacy, namely, the identification of clinical
benefit with overall well-being.
This risk is often accompanied by
another one, namely, that of a localiza-
tional fallacy. It consists in only targeting
individuals psychobiologically, not their
circumstances. In contrast, established
measures such as the World Happiness
Report which are provided by United
Nations institutions measure well-being
macroscopically: GDP per capita, social
support, healthy life expectancy at birth,
freedom to make life choices, generosity,
and perceptions of corruption together
explain 75.5% of the international
variance of happiness rankings in 2012
(Helliwell et al., 2013). It goes without
saying that these indices are also based
on norms, but not primarily driven by
clinical needs, instead broader in scope,
and developed by institutions which
are representing people at large at least
remotely.
An advanced recent proposal consists
in the OECD Guidelines on Measuring
Subjective Well-being, operationalizing
subjective well-being as consisting of
life satisfaction, affect, and eudaimonic
well-being, which in turn consist of
three subcategories each, namely, income,
health, and work satisfaction; anger, worry,
and happiness; competence, autonomy,
and meaning and purpose (OECD, 2013).
Based on these guidelines, people can cre-
ate their own Better Life Index, prioritizing
11 pre-defined dimensions (such as hous-
ing, jobs, education, or safety), and more
than 60,000 citizens from OECD coun-
tries have so far participated2. Using such
methods, the risk of a normative fallacy
can be minimized, since people can choose
their own standards, although ideally they
should be able to design the methods,
too. The results, including meaningful dif-
ferences between countries, indicate that
human enhancement need not be local-
ized in individual psychobiology, but can
also be achieved by socio-political reform.
It turned out, for example, that safety
is valued most highly by participants from
Japan, income and housing by those in the
United States, and education by those in
Finland. To assess the relevance of brain
stimulation, pharmacology, and psychobi-
ological training for human enhancement,
2http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org (accessed May
30, 2014)
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it would be informative to know to what
extent these methods can contribute to
human well-being broadly understood. If
it turned out that the causal link is very
remote and speculative, proponents of
human enhancement could conclude that
socio-political reform is more promising
a means than individual psychobiological
intervention. In the terms of the defini-
tion proposed by Savulescu and colleagues
above, this amounts to not changing the
subject with respect to the circumstances,
but the circumstances with respect to the
subject.
FRAMING AND RELEVANCE
Cognitive enhancement has been framed
as common by leading scholars in the field
who described it as a means “not to get
high, but to get higher grades, to pro-
vide an edge over their fellow students
or to increase in some measurable way
their capacity for learning” (Greely et al.,
2008, p. 702). Greely and colleagues sub-
sequently stated that almost 7% of stu-
dents in the US already use stimulants
like amphetamine or methylphenidate for
cognitive enhancement, with the preva-
lence reaching 25% on some campuses.
In a comment gathering some anecdotal
evidence, I pointed out that such fram-
ings occur regularly in the ethical literature
(Schleim, 2010). This impression is shared
by Lucke et al. (2011) who also carried
out a media analysis of newspaper arti-
cles and found that 94% of the reports
mentioning the prevalence of psychophar-
macological enhancement described it as
common, increasing, or both (Partridge
et al., 2011). Actually, 66% of these reports
referred to the academic literature as evi-
dence. It goes without saying that this
framing of the practice as common and/or
increasing lends the topic high urgency.
In the systematic review of prevalence
studies in student samples by Smith and
Farah, the most comprehensive I know
of, the authors conclude that “[a]mong
college students, estimates of use vary
widely but, taken together, suggest that
the practice is commonplace” (Smith
and Farah, 2011, p. 717). Referring to
this review, Nagel even claims that the
usage is increasing (Nagel, 2014). Both
claims are difficult to justify, though, with
respect to cognitive enhancement: First
of all, it is in the eye of the beholder
what to count as common. The decision
is complicated by the variance in find-
ings, ranging from 1.7 to 34% in stud-
ies with more than thousand students
(N = 12; mean = 9.5%, median = 6.7%).
Sometimes the reported figures reflect past
month prevalence (N = 2; mean = 4.6),
sometimes they refer to last year (N = 6;
mean = 6.7) or even lifetime usage (N =
4; mean = 16.1). Secondly, their authors
often investigated non-medical use, which
allows many different motives for stim-
ulant consumption that do not indicate
cognitive enhancement, such as feeling
high or losing weight. Smith and Farah
summarize that in those surveys address-
ing motives, study-related answers were
dominant but regularly accompanied by
recreational/lifestyle choices (Smith and
Farah, 2011). However, detailed interviews
with consumers at an elite university in
the United States suggest that emotional
rather than cognitive motives drive non-
medical use even for improving studying,
since people report feeling better and over-
coming motivational problems with stim-
ulants (Vrecko, 2013).
For the time being, framing the rele-
vance as common and non-medical use
as cognitive enhancement is therefore, in
my view, in contrast to the best avail-
able evidence. It is even more problematic
to claim that the practice is increas-
ing, because this would require repeated
cross-sectional studies of comparable sam-
ples under standardized conditions. Yet,
even within research groups definitions
of inclusion criteria and ways of sam-
pling data often differ. Nevertheless, what
has been increasing steeply during the last
decades was the production of stimulants
like amphetamine and methylphenidate,
particularly in the United States, and pub-
lications on enhancement (see Figure 1).
That the former increase is not reflected
in the prevalence studies previously men-
tioned is most likely due to the concept
of non-medical use. Both drugs are con-
trolled prescription stimulants and most
epidemiologists as well as ethicists strictly
distinguish medical use as treatment from
non-medical use as either drug abuse or
enhancement.
This framing has wider ramifications
for the scientific community: Without
the treatment/enhancement distinction,
the consumption of stimulants can and
has been analyzed by medical sociolo-
gists under labels such as medicaliza-
tion or pharmaceuticalization (Abraham,
2010; Bell and Figert, 2012); and without
the claim that enhancement is common
or even increasing, the problem appears
much less urgent. By framing stimulant
consumption as enhancement and com-
mon, though, neuroethicists generated a
new ethical problem, new prospects and
risks, that they subsequently could man-
age (see also Conrad and De Vries, 2011;
Littlefield and Johnson, 2012). Indeed,
the steep increase in publications on
enhancement topics coincides with the
inception of instutionalized neuroethics
(Marcus, 2002; Farah, 2012; Figure 1). It
thus becomes apparent that both, medical
sociologists and neuroethicists, have a con-
flict of interest in framing stimulant con-
sumption in the competition for research
funds and high-impact publications.
PROMISES
The abundant literature on enhancement
suggests the possibility to increase learn-
ing, to feel better, and to become more
intelligent by means of brain stimulation,
pharmacology, or psychobiological learn-
ing (Savulescu et al., 2011a; Farah, 2012;
Hildt and Franke, 2013; Nagel, 2014).
However, it is also noted that there is much
that is not known about the working of
stimulants, for example, and that funding
of empirical research is difficult because
it is not about treatment and therefore
outside the purview of disease-oriented
schemes and it is too applied for fun-
ders of basic science (Smith and Farah,
2011). As mentioned in the section on
well-being above, it is furthermore not
clear what the goal of the intervention is
and whether changing the individual in its
circumstances is actually more promising
than changing the circumstances for the
individual.
However, by analogy with biologi-
cal psychiatry it is possible to at least
engage in informed speculation on what
the situation might be like had there
been more agreement on the research
goals and more funding of enhancement
research. When psychiatric researchers
started to prepare the fifth edition of
the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM) they set the aim
to include biomarkers, particularly based
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 148 | 2
Schleim Whose well-being?
FIGURE 1 | Stimulant production and enhancement papers increased strongly. Lines show a
steep increase in publications on cognitive enhancement (blue) and neuroenhancement (yellow),
but only modestly on mood enhancement (orange). Publication numbers are based on a Web of
Science topic search. Bars show a strong increase in production quotas for amphetamine (red) and
methylphenidate (green). In the shown 10-year period from 2004 to 2013, the former increased
5.5-fold, the latter 3.4-fold, after quotas had already been increasing in the 1990s (not shown, but
see Rasmussen, 2008). Figures based on US Drug Enforcement Agency, October 2, 2013,
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/quotas/quota_history.pdf (accessed May 30, 2014),
accumulating amphetamine produced for sale and conversion.
on genetic and neuroimaging research, to
improve diagnosis and treatment (Hyman,
2007). Note that the previous fourth edi-
tion of the DSM listed more than 300
disorders and their respective symptoms
guiding clinical diagnosis (APA, 2000).
It is now widely acknowledged that this
attempt for the fifth edition was unsuccess-
ful, though views on why this happened
and what to do about it differ (Hyman,
2010; Kapur et al., 2012; Walter, 2013;
Kirmayer and Crafa, 2014). Certainly, with
more than one billion dollars annually
spent on research at the National Institutes
of Mental Health alone, lack of fund-
ing was not the problem3. In the light
of decisions by pharmaceutical compa-
nies to close their psychiatric laborato-
ries because of negative prospects (Amara
et al., 2011; Van Gerven and Cohen, 2011)
and reports that prescription stimulants
do not even seem to have a lasting posi-
tive effect on individuals diagnosed with
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(Currie et al., 2013; Sharpe, 2014), the
frequently promised translational possi-
bilities of enhancement research may be
unrealistic (Schleim, 2014). Perhaps we
need to minimize risks of committing a
translational fallacy, too.
3http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/budget/index.shtml
(accessed May 30, 2014)
When Quednow speaks of a “phantom
debate” (Quednow, 2010) or Lucke and
colleagues want to deflate the “neuroen-
hancement bubble” (Lucke et al., 2011),
they appear to have good reasons for doing
so. We should also not forget that people
in many countries are already quite happy
and that in those where they are not, the
difference in happiness is probably not due
to limited access to enhancement technol-
ogy. Clinical research for those suffering
from a disorder should keep the priority
over enhancement. It could even be the
case that too much focus on increasing
well-being and happiness, on how things
might yet be better than they presently
are, might make more people unhappy
in the first place; or, in Schopenhauer’s
words:
“We then recognize that the best, which
the world has to offer, is a painless,
calm, bearable existence and we confine
our claims to these in order to accom-
plish them better. Because not to become
very unhappy, it is the best means that
one may not demand to be very happy.”
(Schopenhauer, 1874, p. 434; author’s
translation).
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